The goal is to survey dependability modeling and analysis of software and systems specified with UML, with focus on reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS). From the literature published in the last decade, 33 approaches presented in 43 papers were identified. They are evaluated according to three sets of criteria regarding UML modeling issues, addressed dependability characteristics, and quality assessment of the surveyed approaches. The survey shows that more works are devoted to reliability and safety, fewer to availability and maintainability, and none to integrity. Many methods support early life-cycle phases (from requirements to design). More research is needed for tool development to automate the derivation of analysis models and to give feedback to designers. 
INTRODUCTION
Dependability is a nonfunctional property (NFP) of a system, defined by Avizienis et al. [2004] as the ability to avoid failures that are more frequent and severe than acceptable. Dependability encompasses a set of attributes: reliability, availability, maintainability, integrity, and safety. The assessment of these attributes may imply quantitative and/or qualitative evaluation of the system, which has been a research topic since the early times of computing; the use of models for this purpose is extensively recognized [Lyu Authors' addresses: S. Bernardi, Centro Universitario de la Defensa, Academia General Militar, Zaragoza, Spain; email: simonab@unizar.es; J. Merseguer, Departamento de Informática e Ingeniería de Sistemas, Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain; email: jmerse@unizar.es; D. C. Petriu, Department of Systems and Computer Engineering, Carleton University, Canada; email: petriu@sce.carleton.ca. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from 1996]. A model is an abstraction of the system for the purpose of understanding it before building it [Rumbaugh et al. 1991] . A software system model describes a specific system view; in a broad sense we can distinguish behavioral and structural software views, which together constitute the model of the system. A dependability model considers the abstractions needed to represent the failures of the system and their consequences. This implies that in some manner the dependability model needs to be related to the behavioral model of the system or at least to its abnormal behaviors. Models are developed using different kinds of languages and/or notations, some of them with an underlying mathematical formalism supporting some kind of analysis (e.g., fault trees, Markov chains, Petri nets, or Bayesian networks). These are called formal models, analyzable models, or models for analysis. The task of developing models is known as modeling, while the task of analyzing quantitative or qualitative properties is known as analysis.
According to the literature, dependability attributes are assessed through formal dependability models or using technical methods (e.g., FMEA, HAZOP) [IEC-60300-3-1 2003] . However, the focus of this survey is not on dependability analysis models per se, but on approaches for modeling and analyzing dependability in the context of UML software models used for software development. We are particularly interested in works contributing toward the integration of dependability modeling and analysis within the UML-based model-driven software development process [Schmidt 2006] . Figure 1 shows an ideal process, where a UML software model used by the software developers is extended with dependability annotations and then (automatically) transformed into a formal dependability model, which is solved with existing solvers and methods. The dependability results from the formal model are mapped to feedback to the developers, expressed in terms of the software model. The process bridges two domains-the software modeling domain and the dependability analysis domain-and is dealing with two categories of models and modeling languages: (a) for software development and (b) for dependability analysis. This survey is focused on how and what dependability annotations need to be added to UML software models (i.e., in the software modeling domain) in order to support the derivation of dependability analysis models that can be used for dependability analysis.
The most widely used modeling language for software development is the Unified Modeling Language [UML 2005] , standardized by the Object Management Group (OMG). There is a large body of work extending UML with concepts required for carrying out quantitative and qualitative analyses of different nonfunctional properties, such as performance, schedulability, dependability, security. For instance, a UMLbased methodology for unifying dependability modeling and analysis by associating the concepts of UML models, dependability, and mathematical analysis was promoted the surveyed works dealing with the dependability analysis aspect, two approaches can be recognized. A first approach transforms the UML-annotated models-such as the (nonformal) dependability model-into a formal dependability model used for analysis (e.g., Fault Trees [Vesely et al. 1981] for safety and reliability analysis, stochastic Petri nets [Ajmone-Marsan et al. 1995] for reliability analysis), as in Figure 1 . Such formal models, as well as methods and tools for their analysis, have been studied and developed for many years, even before the introduction of UML.
The second approach uses the very same annotated UML model, without model transformations, to apply well-known dependability techniques (e.g., HAZard and OPerability study [ 
UK Ministry of Defence 2000]).
We believe that this survey will help researchers by informing them of which topics in the field have already been addressed and which ones are still open and need additional effort. In particular, our study of the literature has revealed that the modeling concern has been more thoroughly treated so far than the analysis concern, which requires more research. Fundamentally, the translations of UML-annotated models into dependability analysis models need to be improved, as does the eventual evaluation of analysis models. Work should be also invested in the feedback from NFP analysis to the design model-for instance, being able to pinpoint design flaws from analysis results. Tool support is another lack we found. Another problem is that there are many proposals for extending UML models with dependability annotations, with each proposal covering only a subset of dependability aspects and using the concepts and terminology inconsistently with each other. This is a consequence of a fact mentioned before, that so far there is no standard UML profile for dependability NFPs that would unify all the necessary annotations. This is another aspect that needs improvement.
This survey comes to fill a gap not addressed in literature by other works. Gokhale [2007] provides the state of the art in architecture-based software reliability analysis. Differences with our paper are that we deal not only with architectural aspects but also with the software requirements and detailed design, and besides reliability, we address the other RAMS attributes. However, Gokhale [2007] is not restricted to architectural designs based on UML; they also consider other languages and architectural proposals. Immonen and Niemelä [2008] specifically concentrate on reliability and/or availability prediction methods based on software architectural models. Finally, the work in Balsamo et al. [2004] is similar to ours in objectives but targeted to performance evaluation instead of dependability.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the most important dependability concepts and introduce a discussion in the UML context, to start drawing the boundaries of the state of the art in UML dependability modeling and analysis. Section 3 introduces the evaluation criteria that, along with dependability concepts, are used to classify and discuss the surveyed works. Sections 4 and 5 present the actual discussion and comparisons of the works. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
DEPENDABILITY MODELING AND ANALYSIS BACKGROUND
This section establishes the basic framework of our work, surveying fundamental dependability concepts. Since the survey covers both UML modeling of dependability as well as its analysis or evaluation, we start by recalling dependability concepts (such as fault, error, and failure), and continue with issues related to dependability analysis, such as traditional approaches to dependability assessment, different kinds of analysis, and basic concepts such as dependability measure. While recalling the basic dependability definitions for these concepts, we also discuss the implications of expressing them in UML (see the sections titled "Discussion in the UML Context"). The goal is to help readers understand the challenges addressed by the surveyed works in order to seamlessly represent such a large set of concepts in UML models.
Definitions of dependability can be obtained from multiple sources, here we mainly follow Avizienis et al. [2004] and Lyu [1996] . In Avizienis et al. [2004] , the dependability terminology is surveyed from a systemic point of view, while Lyu [1996] specifically addresses the software domain, focusing on reliability. Another source is Leveson [1995] for definitions of safety related concepts. Our intention is not to offer a comprehensive guide on the large number of existing dependability definitions (which was the goal of the sources just mentioned) but to clarify the conceptual framework for the survey.
The dependability concepts and issues addressed in this section are summarized in a checklist shown in Table I . Each concept is given a label that will easily permit us to pinpoint it in later discussion (in Sections 4 and 5). The last column of the table indicates whether an issue is addressed in the survey or not. The goal is to place the scope of the survey in the dependability arena. The remainder of the section is organized according to main dependability issues: system view, attributes, threats, and means of the dependability.
System View and Basic Definitions
Before discussing basic definitions for dependability, we need to specify the context in which they apply. Both Avizienis et al. [2004] and Lyu [1996] consider a componentbased view of a system for which dependability is investigated. A component is seen as an entity that interacts with other entities (hardware and/or software) and with the physical world. A component is then by itself a system made up of other components that interact through connectors. It is considered that the system or a component provides an expected service to the environment or the user, which is a sequence of outputs agreeing with a given specification [Lyu 1996 ].
An accepted definition of dependability is the ability of a system to avoid failures that are more frequent and severe than acceptable [Avizienis et al. 2004] ; it encompasses the following attributes (labeled DA in Table I) : reliability, availability, maintainability, integrity, and safety. According to Avizienis et al. [2004] , reliability (DA.R) ensures the continuity of correct service for a given system and is defined in ANSI/IEEE [1991] as "the probability of failure-free software operation for a specified period of time in a specified environment." For repairable systems [Arnold 1973 ]-that is, those that can be recovered after failure-the availability (DA.A) and maintainability (DA.M) attributes are of special significance. The former is defined as the system's readiness for correct service, and the latter represents the system's ability to undergo modifications and repairs. Integrity is related to both dependability and security. In a broad sense, integrity is the absence of improper system alterations. ANSI/IEEE [1991] defines it as the degree to which a system or component prevents unauthorized access to, or modification of, computer programs or data. In Biba [1977] , integrity ensures that the system cannot be corrupted to perform in a manner contrary to the original determination. In safety-critical systems, the safety attribute (DA.S) emphasizes the absence of catastrophic consequences as a result of the system and/or software usage [Leveson 1995] .
2.1.1. Discussion in the UML Context. The fundamental concepts of system, component, connector, and service can be represented using notation offered by the UML diagrams, as these concepts belong to the UML vocabulary. Hence, no additional effort has been carried out by the surveyed works to introduce them. What UML does not initially have is the ability to specify dependability attributes and their properties (e.g., how to define a measure of reliability in a UML diagram). A frequent solution uses the UML profiling mechanism, which allows users to extend UML with domain-specific concepts defined as stereotypes, tagged values, and constraints [UML 2005] , while using standard UML editors. Appendix A describes how the UML profiling mechanisms work. As mentioned in the Introduction, all dependability attributes except integrity have been addressed in some of the UML works herein surveyed.
Dependability Model-Based Evaluation
During the first stages of the life cycle, when implementations are not yet available, dependability attributes can be evaluated by solving formal dependability models. Indeed, dependability measures (DM in Table I ) represent a quantified estimation or calculation of a dependability attribute [Hosford 1960 ]. However, not all dependability attributes can be quantified. For instance, in the safety analysis context, safety properties (DM.S) are not strictly measures, but rather qualitative indicators used to express the level of injury caused by system hazards or the seriousness associated with the system's unsafe states [Leveson 1995] .
Once an estimation of a dependability measure is obtained by solving the formal dependability model, it has to be checked against the dependability requirements (DR) [Littlewood and Strigini 1993] . A dependability requirement can be thought of as an upper or lower bound (DR.BOUND) of a specific dependability measure. However, in the case of safety, a requirement (DR.S) represents the satisfaction of a given safety property (DM.S).
It is important to recall that the computation of reliability, availability, and maintainability measures basically means a quantitative evaluation of the formal dependability model, while safety properties imply the qualitative evaluation of the model [Billinton and Allan 1992] . This does not necessarily mean that the nature of safety models has to differ from the others; for example, Fault-Trees or Petri nets can be used to perform both forms of evaluation, while Bayesian networks provide only quantitative evaluation. It is also true that safety properties can be checked without an underlying formal dependability model [Leveson 1995 ], but with specific techniques such as HAZard and OPerability study (HAZOP) or Functional Failure Analysis (FFA).
2.2.1. Discussion in the UML Context. As explained in the introduction, a UML model is able to describe both the structural and behavioral views of the system, hence the works here surveyed have extended UML to specify measures and requirements. In fact, the majority of the surveyed works propose some mechanism to include measures and/or requirements in the UML models. As previously discussed, most of the works surveyed in this paper introduce an (automatic) transformation of the UML model with dependability annotations into a formal dependability model (e.g., Bayesian networks, Petri nets, Fault Trees) that can be used for computing the desired measures. Such formal dependability models will need to interpret the measures as expressed in the original UML model.
We identified some works that are interested in measures similar to software complexity measures (DM.C), which differ from the measures discussed above in that they are defined in model terms. They are indirect dependability measures that in our scope refer either to "failure-proneness" in software components as in Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [2003] or to the maintainability of the UML design as in Genero et al. [2007] . The latter, for example, uses measures such as diagram structural complexity (e.g., number of associations) or size measures (e.g., number of classes) in relationship with the maintainability of UML class diagrams. Another example is the cyclomatic complexity of UML state machines defined in Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [2003] .
Examples of Dependability Measures and Properties.
In the following, we describe some important dependability measures used in most of the surveyed works. The measures for reliability (DM.R), availability (DM.A) and maintainability (DM.M) are usually defined with respect to time or the number of program runs [Lyu 1996; Trivedi 2001; Hosford 1960; Johnson 1989 ]. The execution time or calendar time are appropriate to define the reliability as:
that is, reliability at time t is the probability that the time to failure (τ ) is greater than t or the probability that the system is functioning correctly during the time interval (0, t] . Considering that F(t) = 1 − R(t) (i.e., unreliability) is a probability distribution function, we can calculate the expectation of the random variable τ as:
This is called Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) [Johnson 1989 ] and represents the expected time until the next failure will be observed. Another measure is the failure rate (also called rate of occurrence of failures), which represents the probability that a component fails between (t, dt), assuming that it has survived until the instant t, and is defined as a function of R(t):
The cumulative failure function denotes the average cumulative failures associated with each point in time,
Maintainability is measured by the probability that the time to repair (θ) falls into the interval (0, t] [Johnson 1989 ]:
Similarly, we can calculate the expectation of the random variable θ as:
that is called Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) , and the repair rate can be calculated as:
A key reliability measure for systems that can be repaired or restored is the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) [Johnson 1989 ], the expected time between two successive failures of a system. Some of the addressed works also consider the system/service reliability on-demand, the probability of success of the service when requested. When the average time to complete a service is known, then it might be possible to convert between MTBF and reliability on-demand.
Availability is defined as the probability that the system is functioning correctly at a given instant [de Souza e Silva and Gail 1989] :
In particular, the steady state availability can be expressed as function of MTTF and MTTR (or MTBF):
Safety properties (DM.S) are traditionally expressed in qualitative terms, such as safety levels or risk factors associated to failures or hazards [Leveson 1995] . Nevertheless, they are often defined in function of quantitative criteria. An interesting example is the safety integrity level (SIL) [IEC-61508 1998 ], which specifies the required protection against system software failure and corresponds to an interval of the "average probability of failure to perform a safety function on demand" [IEC-61508 1998 ] (e.g., SIL1[10E-2, 10E-1), SIL2 [10E-3, 10E-2)). Other examples of safety properties are the probability of reaching (or of being in) a safe/unsafe state and the tolerable accident rate.
Integrity is a property common to dependability and security. Similar to SIL, the concept of integrity level was defined in Biba [1977] , in security context, to grade damage caused by information sabotage. However, for integrity, it is more common to use procedures to verify and ensure the integrity of the system than to use formally defined measures to compute grades of integrity. Clark and Wilson [1987] presented a formal model for integrity verification, while Sailer et al. [2004] developed an architecture for integrity measurement that relies on code measurement based on standards defined by [TCG 2011 ].
Dependability Threats
Faults, errors, and failures are usually referred as threats to dependability (DT) [Avizienis et al. 2004] . They are seen as a causal chain (F-E-F) that threatens the dependability of a system in the sense that the chain completion leads the system to a state that reports incorrect service or outage. More specifically, in F-E-F, a fault is the cause of an error; in turn, the error is part of a state of the system that may lead to a failure (or service failure). In this causal view, an error is seen as an intermediate stage between fault and failure.
In Avizienis et al. [2004] a very rich and precise taxonomy of faults is given. They account, among others, for hardware/software faults, development/operational faults, malicious/nonmalicious faults, fault persistence (DT.FP) and fault occurrence (DT.FO). The latter refers to "single" and "multiple" fault assumption. The quantitative characterization of a "single/multiple" fault assumption distinguishes between the rate and probability of fault occurrences (DT.FOQ).
1 The faulty behavior of the components, connectors, and services (DT.FB) means to identify the states of these elements in which a fault is active [Hawkings et al. 2003 ].
Erroneous behavior (DT.EB) of a component, connector or service is the counterpart of faulty behavior (DT.FB), that is, a characterization of error states for components, connectors, and services due to a fault occurrence [Hawkings et al. 2003 ]. DT.EB and DT.FB are common in the model-based dependability. The quantitative characterization of an error (DT.EQ) is the probability of its occurrence assuming that the fault has positively occurred (DT.FOQ). On the other hand and due to the component-based assumption, sometimes a component raises an error that does not reach the system boundaries, which means that it does not cause a failure. This obviously happens when the service delivered by the component is not in the system interface. However, such a component may offer its service to another internal component; this may lead to error propagation between components [Cortellessa and Grassi 2007] .
Failures or service failures are events that occur when the user perceives that the system ceases to deliver the expected service [Avizienis et al. 2004] . A failure can be classified according to different modes (DT.FMD to DT.FMDep) [Powell 1992] . A failure mode is the way in which the system manifests the deviation from correct to incorrect service. A failure mode with regard to the domain (DT.FMD) is classified as a "content" and/or "timing" failure. Detectability (DT.FMDet) distinguishes signaled failures, those in which the system sends a warning signal to the user, and unsignalled ones. The consistency criteria (DT.FMC) differentiates consistent from inconsistent or byzantine failures [Lamport et al. 1982] . The consequence of a failure grades it into severity levels (DT.FMSL) (referred to in Section 2.2 as a safety measure named safety level). Different criteria can be used to define severity levels; for example, according to the standard [MIL-STD-882d 1999] , they are rated as catastrophic, critical, marginal, or minor. Finally, failures can be dependent or independent (DT.FMDep). Failures are dependent when the affected components share the cause of the failure, in other words, the error is common to all of them. An example of multiple dependent failures is a "common failure mode," which typically occurs within a redundant structure.
Failure behavior (DT.FailB) of a component (connector or service) refers to the specification of failure events/conditions that lead to the degraded/failure states of the component (connector or service) as well as the degraded/failure states themselves [Bondavalli et al. 2001] .
For safety-critical systems, the concepts of fault, error, and failure are supplemented with that of hazard. Leveson [1995] defines hazard as a state or set of conditions in a system that, together with other conditions in the environment of the system, will inevitably lead to an accident. An accident is an undesired and unplanned (but not necessarily unexpected) event that results in (at least) a specified level of loss. For every possible hazard in the system, it is important to know, at least, its origin (DT.HO) and main characteristics-its severity (DT.HS) and likelihood (DT.HL) [Leveson 1995] . The hazard severity is defined as the worst accident that could result from the hazard, and as in the case of failures, hazard severity can be graded by severity levels, such as minor, marginal, critical, and catastrophic. The hazard likelihood can be defined quantitatively or qualitatively (e.g., frequent, probable, occasional, remote, improbable, impossible). Severity and likelihood are combined to obtain the hazard level. Some safety-critical techniques, such as HAZOP [UK Ministry of Defence 2000], use guidewords (DT.HGW) and parameters (specifics of the process in study) to identify hazards in the system. For example, the set of guide-words in HAZOP is: No, More, Less, As Well As, Reverse, and Other Than.
2.3.1. Discussion in the UML Context. We found that only two kinds of fault characteristics are addressed in the surveyed works: fault persistence (DT.FP) and fault occurrence (DT.FO). As for error propagation, we found that only its description (DT.EP) was given in surveyed works (e.g., [Pai and Dugan 2002] ) and a quantitative characterization (DT.EPQ), e.g., [Yacoub et al. 2004] , which basically specifies the probability of propagation occurrence.
Dependability Means
The problem of achieving a dependable software/system is usually addressed by applying four technical methods, also known as dependability means [Avizienis et al. 2004] : fault prevention, fault removal, fault tolerance, and fault forecasting. Fault prevention encourages the use of techniques that prevent the system from faults [Chillarege et al. 1992] . Formal methods are useful for performing automatic software verification that, together with software testing, are common techniques for fault removal [Boehm 1984; Weyuker 1982] . Fault tolerance techniques [Avižienis 1967; Lyu 1995] aim at avoiding failures despite the presence of faults after the software or system is deployed. The last method, fault/failure forecasting, is carried out through the qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the system behavior with respect to fault/failure occurrences [Meyer 1980] . Fault tolerance techniques offer system recovery (FT.R) and error detection to achieve failure avoidance. Recovery tries to transform an erroneous or faulty system state into a correct one by using error handling and fault handling techniques. Error handling uses rollback, rollforward, and compensation, while fault handling relies on diagnosis, isolation, reconfiguration, and reinitialization.
Fault tolerance techniques can be implemented in different ways (e.g., redundancy, n-version, reflection, or self-checking components) [Avizienis 1985; Huang and Kindala 1996] . Redundancy (R) is characterized by: -type 2 (R.T): information, software, and hardware; -level (R.L): number of components in a redundant structure; -failures (R.F): maximum number of tolerated failures; -roles played by the component within the FT structure (R.R): replica, controller, adjudicator, voter, hot/cold/warm spare.
Maintenance 3 follows fault handling in the life cycle and refers to repairs (M.R) as well as modifications (M.M) of the system during the operational phase [ISO/IEC 14764 2006] . The distinction between fault tolerance and maintenance is that the latter is carried out by an external actor. Moreover, repair and fault tolerance are much related concepts; actually, repair is seen sometimes as a fault tolerance activity.
2.4.1. Discussion in the UML Context. Among dependability means, fault tolerance is paid more attention in the surveyed works. System recovery is the only fault tolerance technique addressed in the works here surveyed.
Fault prevention and fault removal have not been addressed, which seems reasonable since fault prevention is mostly a concern of development methodologies rather than of modeling notations, while fault removal is carried out during the development and system operational stages, whereas UML is usually exploited in early life cycle stages. Different is the case of fault/failure forecasting, which can be carried out during development (evaluation testing [Boehm 1984] ) but also in early stages, through modeling. Dependability models (mentioned in Section 2.2 for measures estimation) can also be useful for forecasting faults or failures. A common approach in some of the surveyed works is that analysts try to identify where the fault/failure could be located in the dependability model (e.g., a Petri net) and then trace back to the UML design where the fault/failure emerged in the system.
EVALUATION CRITERIA
This section introduces and discusses the set of evaluation criteria that constitute the basis for analysis in the survey. Having a set of evaluation criteria will allow us to present, discuss, and classify the surveyed works, tasks that are carried out in Sections 4 and 5. For an easy presentation, we merged these criteria into three groups summarized in Table II . The first group illustrates how the surveyed approaches deal with important software engineering and UML modeling aspects. The second group concentrates on dependability concerns, and the third addresses the quality of the approaches. Some criteria in the first and third groups have been taken from the surveys of Balsamo et al. [2004] and Immonen and Niemelä [2008] ; the rest have been identified during literature review, while reading and comparing the surveyed papers.
Software Engineering and UML
(C1) Life-cycle phase. Almost all of the surveyed approaches aim to obtain dependability results early in the software life cycle. Advantages of getting dependability results prior to implementation were discussed in the introduction. Most of the surveyed approaches address the following phases: requirements, design, and software We have also found works targetting the implementation and deployment phases. (C2) Diagrams. As explained in Appendix A, UML distinguishes between structural and behavioral diagrams. The kind of UML diagrams used by an approach strongly relates to what software life-cycle phase the approach addresses. In early phases, the structural diagrams used are mainly class and object, and the behavioral diagrams are use case, sequence, state machine, activity, collaboration, and interaction overview diagrams. In later phases, component and deployment diagrams are used.
(C3) Software development process. The surveyed approaches are applied in conjunction with a variety of software development processes. We have identified the following cases.
-General: all traditional software development processes (iterative, incremental, waterfall, or a combination of them). -Use case: use-case based process [Jacobson 1995 ].
-CBSE: component-based software development process [Szyperski 1998 ].
-SPL: specifically addressing Software Product Lines [Clements and Northrop 2001 ].
-MDD: Model Driven Development processes [Stahl and Völter 2006] . Although MDD can be applied in conjunction with all of the above categories, we treat it separately, for simplicity. Note that the categories in the next criterion, the software domain, can also be addressed by using MDD techniques.
(C4) Software domain. The approaches can also be classified by the specific software domain they address. We have identified the following. Dependability Modeling and Analysis of Software Systems Specified with UML 2:13 -SOA: targeted to service-based systems [Bell 2008 ].
-General: approaches not focused on a specific software domain.
(C5) Application domain. Most of the approaches are focused on the development of general software systems, so they fall in what we call the general category. However, a few of them target a specific application domain, in particular: aerospace, automotive, railway control, and automated production.
(C6) Dependability specification. A common technique for introducing dependability specifications (input parameters, output parameters, and requirements-criteria C11, C12, and C13) in the UML diagrams is by using UML profiles (see Appendix A for an explanation). However, some of the analyzed works use other approaches, such as OCL restrictions (Object Constraint Language [OCL 2010] of UML), nonextended UML models, or UML extension mechanisms (notes, stereotypes, and tagged values) not organized around a specific profile.
(C7) Tool support. UML diagrams are supported by a large variety of CASE tools (Computer Aided Software Engineering), both commercial and noncommercial. The integration of an approach with a tool allows users to incorporate the dependability specification as extensions to the UML model. The more advanced tools also incorporate as a feature the analysis of the underlying dependability model, while others make use of a third-party tool that actually supports the analysis of the model.
We consider important at this point to highlight that the criteria given in this section define differences among UML-based approaches and the rest of model-based approaches. These differences emphasize the need for a separate study of these two concerns, as we justify in the following.
A dependability specification (C6) accomplished with UML will use the resources UML offers, such OCL or extension mechanisms; however, this does not apply to other model-based approaches. This aspect also involves tool support (C7) since comparisons among UML and non-UML tools will be meaningless, for the same reasons. Moreover, tools based on UML are nowadays dominant in the software engineering market and they have left little room for others. Another important aspect concerns the development approaches (C3), since they can be strongly influenced by UML. For example, CBSE-like approaches develop architectural models according to UML component and deployment diagrams. More significant is the example of use-case based approaches, since today all of them follow the UML notation. Last but not least is the importance of some methodological aspects of the UML diagrams related to the software life cycle (C1). When a phase-for example, behavioral design-is accomplished with UML, it mandatorily has to be carried out using the UML diagrams for the purpose (e.g., state machines or sequence diagrams). However, for other model-based approaches, the field is opened and they are not restricted by diagrams or by the phase-they can be applied, so, some of them use formal specification languages, for which hundreds of approaches exist, such as Z [2002] , Troll [Jungclaus et al. 1996] , and process algebralike languages [Fokking 2000 ]), others use formal graphical models (e.g., stochastic Petri nets [Ajmone-Marsan et al. 1995] , or queuing network models [Lazowska et al. 1984] ), and the list may continue.
For all these reasons, we argue that UML has evolved as a language to the extent that the methodologies, specifications, and tools around it are complex and huge enough in number to constitute a body of knowledge that deserves to be studied separately.
Dependability Characteristics
This group of criteria is based on the dependability concepts in Table I , discussed in Section 2. Here, though, we have added two other important concerns, the analysis type and the analysis model.
(C8) Attribute. This is a cross-reference to DA from the checklist in Table I , so it refers to reliability (DA.R), availability (DA.A), maintainability (DA.M), and safety (DA.S).
(C9) Analysis type. The nature of the dependability analysis may be either quantitative or qualitative , and this strongly constrains the type of specification, as we later discuss. For quantitative analysis, we have found approaches that follow either stochastic analysis or not stochastic. For the sake of simplicity, "stochastic" and "probabilistic" are considered synonymous. In general, qualitative analysis aims to prove dependability properties, while quantitative analysis aims to estimate dependability measures.
(C10) Analysis model. The analysis of a dependability model (either quantitative or qualitative) requires a proper specification of the input/output parameters and requirements, as explained here.
(C11) Input parameters. Are the input dependability parameters required by the approach to effectively carry out the proposed analysis. They support the specification of dependability characteristics (cross-reference to DM, DT, FT, M, and R from the checklist in Table I ).
(C12) Output parameters. The kind of dependability measures or properties the approach evaluates (cross-reference to DM from the checklist in Table I ).
(C13) Requirements. The kind of requirements the approach supports (crossreference to DR from the checklist in Table I ).
Observe that criteria C11 and C12 reference the dependability measure item of the checklist in Table I (DM) . Indeed, an approach may require dependability measures as input parameters; for example, the MTTF of system components is needed to evaluate the overall system failure rate.
Quality
The criteria in this group will help to assess the overall quality and maturity of the surveyed approaches.
(C14) Validation. Some of the approaches have not been validated at the time of this publication, while for others a validation effort has been carried out. Most often, the validation is carried out by the means of case studies that demonstrate, using realistic examples, how the dependability concepts are integrated with UML; sometimes, it is also shown how to obtain a dependability analysis model from the UML model. In a few works, empirical analysis is used instead, which mainly consists of extrapolating information, using testable working hypotheses, from the application of the proposal by third parties.
Therefore, in this criteria, we will distinguish approaches belonging to one of the following categories: case studies, empirical analysis, and no validation.
(C15) Compliance with standards. Several dependability standards exist, some with general purpose [ISO/IEC9126-1.2 2001; IEC-60300-3-1 2003; IEC-61508 1998 ], others targeted to specific application domains [MIL-STD-882d 1999; MIL-STD-1629A 1984 ARP-4754 1994; ARP-4761 1995; RTCA 1992; EN-50126 1999; EN-50128 2001; EN-50129 2001] . Compliance of an approach with a standard certainly represents an asset; this is especially true in the safety domain, where certifications of following standards are common practice. In this regard, we will classify an approach as compliant when it adheres to some standard or not compliant otherwise.
(C16) Presentation of results. When the dependability analysis has been carried out, results should be automatically interpreted in the problem domain and subsequently presented to the software engineer. However, this is a tricky concern that, in our opinion, has not yet been satisfactorily solved by any of the surveyed approaches. Despite this drawback, some of the approaches present the results in some basic form (for example, in textual, tabular, or plot forms). The best approaches feedback results to the same UML model (e.g., using trace visualization on sequence diagrams) and/or provide support for sensitivity analysis. We classify approaches in four categories: N/A (do not deal with this aspect), basic (offer some kind of basic support), UML feedback, and sensitivity analysis.
(C17) Limitations. The analyzed approaches present drawbacks related to some of the previous criteria. For example, a few of them do not offer UML annotations for the definition of basic input parameters, such as failures of components. The large number and diversity of these limitations hindered us from classifying them. However, we studied these limitations and pointed out the more relevant.
CONTRIBUTIONS
We surveyed 33 approaches (a total of 43 papers) addressing dependability modeling and analysis of UML-based software systems and collected the information regarding the criteria defined in the previous section. They are presented according to the dependability attribute they address (criterion C8), such as reliability, availability, maintainability, or safety. Approaches focused on more than one dependability attribute will be presented in the last subsection.
Reliability
A first set of surveyed works contribute specifically to the reliability analysis of UMLbased software systems. Following criterion C1, software architecture and design are the only phases of the software life cycle dealt with by these works, so Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 address them, respectively. Since most of the works in this group follow a component-based approach, criterion C3, Section 4.1.3 discusses this aspect.
4.1.1. Software Architecture. D'Ambrogio et al. [2002] define a transformation of sequence and deployment diagrams (C2) into Fault Tree models (C10) to predict the system failure rate (C12 -DM.R). Although no UML extension standard mechanisms are used (C6), several UML model elements whose failure (basic events in Fault Tree models) can lead to the system failure (top-event in Fault Tree models) are identified, such as failure of nodes and communication paths, call/return actions, and operations. Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) is assigned to such elements as input parameter (C11 -DM.R).
Both Yacoub et al. [2004] and Rodrigues et al. [2005] aim at calculating the system reliability on-demand (C12 -DM.R) as a function of the component/connector reliability (C11 -DM.R) and the scenario execution probabilities. Yacoub et al. [2004] also consider the probability of error propagation between components (DT.EPQ). To compute the metric, Yacoub et al. [2004] construct a probabilistic model, called Component Dependency Graph (CDG), from sequence diagrams, and develop an algorithm based on the CDG. Instead, Rodrigues et al. [2005] use Labeled Transition Systems to synthesize sequence diagrams and interpret them as Markov models (C2,C10).
4.1.2. Software Design. Singh et al. [2001] and Cortellessa et al. [2002] use the Bayesian framework (C10) to derive the probability distribution of the system reliability (C12 -DM.R) from UML use case and sequence diagrams (C2). Cortellessa et al. [2002] improve the previous approach of Singh et al. [2001] by considering deployment Ambrogio et al. 2002] C2, C6, C10, C11, C12 [Yacoub et al. 2004] C11, C12 [Rodrigues et al. 2005] C2, C10, C11, C12 [Singh et al. 2001] C2, C10, C12 [Cortellessa et al. 2002] C2, C10, C11, C12 [Pai and Dugan 2002] C6, C10, C11, C12 [Grassi et al. 2005; 2007] C3, C6, C10, C11, C12 [David et al. 2009] C10, C11, C17
diagrams and the connector failure (Beta) distribution, in addition to the component failure (Beta) distribution and the use case execution probabilities (C11 -DM.R). Pai and Dugan [2002] use dynamic Fault Tree as target formalism (C10) to evaluate the system unreliability (C12 -DM.R) of fault-tolerant software systems. Unlike D'Ambrogio et al. [2002] , Pai and Dugan [2002] introduce a set of stereotypes and tags to enrich UML system models with information needed for the reliability analysis (C6). In particular, tags are used to define input parameters, such as the failure rate of system components and the error propagation probability (C11 -DT.EPQ, DM.R). The method supports the modeling and analysis of sequence error propagations (DT.EP) that lead to dependent failures (DT.FMDep), redundancies, and reconfiguration activities (FT.R). Several stereotypes are defined to represent different kinds of dependencies between system components and to model the type of spare components, such as hot, cold, and warm spares (R.T). Grassi et al. [2005 and 2007] propose a model-driven transformation framework (C3) for the performance and reliability analysis of component-based systems. Grassi et al. build an intermediate model that acts as a bridge between the annotated UML models and the analysis-oriented models. In particular, discrete-time Markov process models (C10) can be derived for the computation of the service reliability (C12 -DM.R). Grassi et al. use the UML extensions of Cortellessa and Pompei [2004] (C6) and complements them by assigning failure input parameters to both hardware and software components and considering atomic failures and failure probability distribution functions (C11 -DM.R).
Finally, David et al. [2009] focuses on the identification of behavioral failure modes, such as with respect to their detectability (C11 -DT.FMDet), in system design using the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) technique (C10). Besides UML, SysML [SysML 2010 ] is also used for specification of systems functional behavior. The main drawback of the approach is that a Dysfunctional Behavior data-base that organizes the knowledge about possible elementary failure modes of components needs to be constructed and maintained, in order to support an automated reuse of the method (C17). Ambrogio et al. 2002] C3, C9 [Yacoub et al. 2004] C3, C9 [Rodrigues et al. 2005] C3, C9, C16 [Singh et al. 2001] C3, C9, C17 [Cortellessa et al. 2002] C3, C9, C17 [Grassi et al. 2005; 2007] C3, C9 [Cortellessa and Pompei 2004] C3, C6, C11 [Genero et al. 2003; Genero et al. 2007] C1, C2, C11, C12, C14, C15, C17
independent scenarios and sequential execution of components and Singh et al. [2001] and Cortellessa et al. [2002] rely on the regularity assumption of component/connector failure probability distributions (i.e., component busy periods are characterized by the same failure probability distribution) -(C17). They all provide support to analyze the system reliability's sensitivity to the critical components, but the results of the analysis are only fed-back to the UML model using annotations in Rodrigues et al. [2005] (C16). Finally, Cortellessa and Pompei [2004] provide support to the reliability analysis of component-based systems in both phases (architecture and design), by proposing UML extensions within the frameworks of the SPT and QoS&FT standard profiles (C6). In particular, the set of stereotypes are specialization of stereotypes defined in the General Resource Modeling package of the SPT profile. The most interesting input parameters considered are the atomic failure probabilities of software components or (logical/physical) links (C11 -DM.R); that is, the probability that a component or connector fails in a single invocation of it.
Availability
To the best of our knowledge, Bernardi and Merseguer [2006] offer the only work that tackles, exclusively, software availability. They devise a method to evaluate the quality of service (QoS) of fault tolerant (FT) distributed system design specification (C1) under a late-timing failure assumption (C11 -DT.FMD). The QoS metric is defined as a function of two nonfunctional requirements (C13 -DR.BOUND): one is related to the system availability, that is, the time to detect an error and isolate it (FT.ED)-and the other is related to the cost of the FT strategy-the communication overhead. Bernardi and Merseguer [2006] propose a transformation of UML sequence, state-chart, and deployment diagrams (C2), annotated with the SPT profile [UML-SPT] into a performability Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN) model (C10). The latter is then analyzed via simulation to evaluate, under different system configurations, the considered QoS metric (C16). State-charts are also proposed for the quantitative characterization of faults (DT.FOQ) as well as for the behavioral specification of different types of fault with respect to their timing persistency (DT.FP). In this case, UML extensions have been explicitly introduced (C6), since the SPT profile does not support the specification of dependability parameters (e.g., fault occurrence probabilities). [Hansen et al. 2004] C2, C5, C10, C11, C17 [Iwu et al. 2007] C2, C3, C5, C6, C7, C10, C11, C12, C13 [Liu et al. 2007] C2, C3, C6, C10, C11, C12, C13, C16, C17
Maintainability
Genero et al. [2003] and Genero et al. [2007] are the only approaches, among the surveyed set, that address specifically the maintainability of UML specifications during the design stage of the software life cycle (C1). They rely on the software quality standard [ISO/IEC9126-1.2] (C15) and propose a set of metrics as good predictors of two maintainability subcharacteristics: understandability and modifiability (C11 -M.M). The set of metrics includes both typical size metrics (e.g., number of classes, attributes, and methods) and structural complexity metrics (e.g., number of aggregations, dependencies, and generalizations) -(C12 -DM.C) -that can be noted on UML class diagrams (C2). An empirical analysis is carried out to evaluate the correlation between the proposed metrics and the considered maintainability characteristics (C14). Nevertheless, no guidelines are provided to software designers on how to use such metrics to evaluate the maintainability of the UML class diagrams (C17).
Safety
Another group of works focus on safety-critical systems. They are presented according to the activities they support along the software life cycle (C1). We analyze works focused on risk assessment, irrespective of phase of the life cycle, in Section 4.4.5.
4.4.1. Requirements Elicitation. The safety requirement elicitation approaches are application domain-specific (C5) and use use case diagrams (C2,C3) to identify system-level functionalities such as for aerospace software [Allenby and Kelly 2001] or in the automotive domain [Johannessen et al. 2001] [Hawkings et al. 2003] C2, C6, C10, C11, C13 C2, C5, C6, C11, C12 [Ober et al. 2006] C2, C4, C6, C10, C11, C12, C13, [Zoughbi et al. 2006 [Zoughbi et al. , 2007 C2, C5, C6, C11, C12, C14, C16, C17 C3), Hansen et al. [2004] consider each model element in package, class, component, object, sequence, and deployment diagrams (C2). The main drawback of Hansen et al. [2004] is the limited scalability of their proposal; when applied to a real case study, it may result in a time-consuming activity (C17). Iwu et al. [2007] also use Fault Tree analysis to combine faults that give rise to identified hazards (C10). Such faults are related to UML model elements (e.g., classes in class diagrams, messages in sequence diagrams -C2) and are used to establish derived safety requirements. Safety requirements and healthiness properties (C13 -DR.S, C12 -DM.S) are specified using Practical Formal Specification state machines (C6), and tool support is provided to check for consistency and completeness (C7). Liu et al. [2007] address safety analysis of the variations in software product-lines, proposing a five-step approach (C3). In the first step, common and variability analysis is carried out to identify requirements for the entire product line and for specific product members. Hazard analysis is then performed by using Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA), customized to a product line domain (C10). The root node of the tree is typically a negation of a safety requirement, or it can be identified from preexisting hazard lists (C11 -DT.HGW), while the leaf nodes are labeled with a commonality or variation, previously identified. In the third step, such leaf nodes are mapped into architectural components, whose behavior is then modeled with a UML state-chart (C2). Safety requirement and failure scenarios are then derived from the Fault Tree (C13 -DR.S), and, finally, behavioral safety-properties (C12 -DM.S) are checked in state-based models (C6) through scenario-guided execution or animation (C16). The safety properties that can be automatically checked include ordering logic and the relative timing of failures of events, while, due to the tool limitations, the verification of exact time values is not supported (C17). Zoughbi et al. [2007 and consider the UML design of safety critical software. Hawkings et al. [2003] address the preliminary system safety assessment of UML design. They construct a Fault Tree (C10) where hazardous basic events are related to classes and operations in UML Class Diagrams (C2). Then, the behavior of the classes -represented by UML state-charts -is analyzed in order to derive detailed safety requirements. Beside the normal behavior, the faulty behavior (C11 -DT.FB) is modeled by adding extra transitions in the state-charts with the help of hazard guidewords (e.g., omission, commission, and value) (C11 -DT.FMD, DT.HGW). A reachability analysis of the mutated state-chart is performed to check whether the introduced faulty behavior can lead to unsafe states. The derived safety requirements restrict the hazardous behaviors and are specified with OCL (C6) as contracts on classes/operations (C13 -DR.S).
The modeling of normal and faulty behavior of a system component in a single state machine (C2,C11 -DT.FB) is also proposed by Pataricza et al. [2003] , whose objective is to identify the error propagation paths leading to catastrophic failures in railway control software (C5,C12 -DM.S). They define UML stereotypes (C6) for erroneous states and correcting transitions in UML state machines (C11 -DT.EB, DT.EP, FT.R).
Ober et al. [2006] present a technique for the verification of the safety properties of real-time and embedded systems (C4) via model checking (C12 -DM.S).
A UML profile (OMEGA) is defined (C6) to specify timing constraints in the UML design (class diagrams and state machines, C2) as well as dynamic and time-dependent safety requirements (C13 -DR.S). In particular, the latter are expressed by observers, UML classes, whose behavior is described as a state machine characterized by error or invalid states (C11 -DT.EB). Both design and requirements are then transformed into communicating extended timed automata (C10), and the design is verified against the requirements using model-checking techniques. Zoughbi et al. [2007 and define a UML profile (C6) for the specification of safety concepts of aerospace software systems (C5) in the design phase, to support the automated generation of certification-related information. The proposed UML extensions are compliant to the airworthiness standard [RTCA] (C15), and they are used to record safety-related design decisions -for example, failure consequence/hazard severity (C11 -DT.FMSL, DT.HS), roles within replicated structures (C11 -R.R), safety/confidence levels (C12 -DM.S), and complexity metrics (C12 -DM.C) for collaboration, class, operation, and relationship (C2) -and trace them back to the requirements (C16). Their approach is based on a rigorous definition of the profile (through a safety domain model) and an exhaustive completeness/consistency assessment with respect to the considered safety standard (C14). The main weakness is the use of dynamic concepts (through the profile) that extend typically static concepts, leading to mixed static/dynamic views in the same UML diagram (class diagram) -(C17). Cancila et al. [2009] consider software architecture and design specifications of railway transport systems (C5) and propose a UML profile (SOPHIA) for safety concerns (C6). SOPHIA relies on the OMG standard profile MARTE to express safety metrics (tolerable accident rate, i.e., TAR, and frequency of an accident-C12 -DM.S), requirements (i.e., maximum TAR-C13 -DR.BOUND), and characteristics (accident severity, accident severity/frequency table, accident frequency-C11 -DT.HS, DT.HL). The work also proposes an algorithm for the automatic generation of derived safety attribute values (i.e., TAR) in a design model. Lu and Halang [2007] address the design of safety-critical distributed embedded real-time systems (C4) and the automated code derivation from UML design, considering PEARL as the target programming language and function blocks [IEC-61131-1] (C15) to support the code reusability. A set of PEARL code structures are proposed as suitable for building applications that have to meet safety integrity level requirements [IEC-61508] (C13 -DR.BOUND). The SIL-related PEARL constructs are represented as UML stereotypes and the Object Constraint Language (OCL) is used to specify constraints (i.e., pre-and post-conditions, invariants) on the expected execution of stereotyped components (C6). Lu and Halang [2007] define UML extensions also for representing function block diagrams as UML component diagrams. A limitation of the approach concerns the timing-related issues, which are vaguely dealt with in the paper (C17).
4.4.5. Risk Assessment. Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [2003] and Hassan et al. [2005] address the risk assessment step within the system safety analysis process. They both consider software architectures specified with UML. Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [2003] estimate the scenario risk factor (C12 -DM.S) from risk factors associated with software components and connectors by constructing and solving a Markovian model (C10). The component/connector risk factor is computed as the product of two safety metrics: the severity level (C11 -DT.FMSL, DT.HS) and the complexity/coupling associated with the component/connector. The severity is obtained using FMEA technique (C10), while the component complexity and connector coupling are estimated considering the UML dynamic specifications -state machines and sequence diagrams -(C2,C12 -DM.C). Hassan et al. [2005] focus on the problem of evaluating the failure severity based on a UML specification. They integrate different severity techniques (FFA, FMEA, and FTA -C10) to identify and relate system-level hazards and component/connector failure modes (C11 -DT.HO, DT.HL, DT.HGW). A cost of failure graph is then constructed to evaluate the cost of failure (C12 -DM.S) of system execution scenarios and software components/connectors. The costs of failure are reported in the UML models with the use of notes (C6). Finally, the scenario and component/connector severity (C11 -DT.FMSL, DT.HS) are obtained from the estimated costs of failure using a nonlinear mapping. Both Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [2003] and Hassan et al. [2005] rely on the US military standard for safety critical systems [MIL-STD-1629A] (C15).
More Than One Dependability Attribute
The remaining works address several dependability properties at a time. In the following, we analyze them. 4.5.1. Reliability and Availability. Bondavalli et al. [2001] , Majzik et al. [2003] , Pataricza [2000] , DeMiguel et al. [2001] , and Leangsuksun et al. [2003] aim at analyzing the reliability and availability of UML-based software systems in different phases of the software life cycle (from requirement to deployment, C1), using stochastic techniques (C9). They all adopt a model transformation approach to get an analyzable model from UML-annotated models. Also, Dal Cin [2003] considers the reliability and availability properties, but his main contribution is providing a support for the specification of fault-tolerant and real-time software systems rather than just analysis. Bondavalli et al. [2001] , Majzik et al. [2003] , and Pataricza [2000] present the most comprehensive approach, with respect to the checklist of Table I , for reliability and the availability analysis of UML software architectures (C1). UML standard extension mechanisms (i.e., stereotypes and tags) are used for annotating dependability properties of software systems on UML specifications (C6). Through a rigorous graph transformation process, timed Petri net models (C10) are derived via an intermediate model that captures the relevant dependability information from the annotated UML models. Component faulty behavior is triggered by independent fault injectors, modeled as state machines (C2), that allow one to specify fault activation restrictions, such as single fault assumption (C11 -DT.FO). Several input parameters are defined (C11) for hardware and software components, such as fault occurrence rate (DT.FOQ), the percentage of permanent faults (DT.FP), the error latency for components with an internal state (DT.EQ), and repair delay ( DM.M). The approach also supports the specification of error propagation between components (DT.EPQ) by assigning a probability to the model elements representing either relationships (e.g., associations) or interactions between such components (e.g., communication paths, messages). The set of dependability measures that can be evaluated (C12 -DM.R,DM.A) includes the reliability probability distribution function, MTTF, the steady state, and the immediate availability. Concerning the type of failures with respect to their dependency, both independent and dependent failures can be specified (C11 -DT.FMDep). In particular, it is possible to assign common failure mode occurrence tags to redundant components belonging to complex FT structures (C11 -R.L, R.R). Failures can be discriminated also with respect to the domain (C11 -DT.FMD). Extensions for states and events of state machines representing the behavior of redundancy manager components are introduced, in order to discriminate normal and failure states and events (C11 -DT.FailB). Such extensions are used to analyze the failure conditions of the FT structures. The main drawback of the UML extensions proposed by Bondavalli et al. [2001] , Majzik et al. [2003] , and Pataricza [2000] is the introduction of unnecessary redundant information in the UML system model, since the specification of some parameters requires the joint use of more than one stereotype (C17). For example, a node that models a hardware component in UML must be stereotyped as hardware and stateful to specify the error latency.
DeMiguel et al. [2001] consider the software architecture and detailed design UML specification of distributed real-time systems (C1,C4). Simulation models are generated automatically from UML models, annotated with dependability input parameters (C11) that is, object and network error occurrence and object time to failure and repair (DT.EB, DT.EQ, DM.R, DM.M). In particular, the tool [OpNet 1999 ] is used as a simulation kernel (C7). The approach supports the evaluation of several dependability measures, such as object and network availability, object failure distribution (C12 -DM.A, DM.R), and various types of statistics that can be computed (i.e., mean, variance, distribution). Leangsuksun et al. [2003] derive from UML deployment diagrams (C2)-normally used during the late software design and deployment stages (C1)-Fault Tree and Markov chain models (C10) for the analysis of the reliability and availability (C8), respectively. The UML diagrams are annotated (C6) with node failure rate and repair rate parameters (C11 -DM.R, DM.M). The method supports the computation of the reliability (i.e., survival function) and the steady state availability (C12 -DM.R, DM.A), under hardware failure independence assumptions.
Dal Cin [2003] proposes a UML profile (C6) for designing dependability mechanisms-hardware/software components to be implemented or integrated in the real-time system (C4) to ensure fault tolerance (C11 -FT.ED, FT.R, R.R). The proposed profile is aimed at supporting the quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of the fault tolerant strategy adopted (C9), in terms of reliability and steady state availability (C12 -DM.R, DM.A). It provides a language (i.e., SQIRL) for specifying stochastic reliability and availability requirements of such mechanisms (C13 -DR.BOUND). However, the profile lacks support for modeling interactions among dependability mechanisms and the system components (C17). 4.5.2. Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability. The following two approaches deal, as the previous ones, with reliability and availability, in addition to maintainability (C8). Addouche and Antoine [2004] , Addouche et al. [2006] , and Bernardi et al. [2004a and 2004b] provide support in the requirement and design phases (C1) for real-time software development (C4). In particular, the considered application domains are automated production systems and distributed control automation systems (C5). 
Works
Criteria [Bondavalli et al. 2001; Majzik et al. 2003; Pataricza 2000] C1, C2, C6, C9, C10, C11, C12, C17 [DeMiguel et al. 2001] C1, C4, C9, C11, C12 [Leangsuksun et al. 2003] C1, C2, C6, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12 [Dal Cin 2003] C4, C6, C9,, C11, C12, C13, C17 Addouche and Antoine [2004] and Addouche et al. [2006] define a profile (C6) that is compliant with the General Resource Modeling package of the SPT profile [UML-SPT]. The UML extensions are used to annotate UML models with QoS characteristics (C11 -DM.R, DM.M) and to derive probabilistic time automata (C10) for the verification of dependability properties via temporal logic formulas and model checking (C12 -DM.R, DM.A, DM.M). A pair of stereotypes is also defined to include probabilistic aspects of functioning and malfunctioning. The static model of the system is enriched with new stereotyped classes that are associated with each class representing a system resource. Such new classes are used to specify, via their attributes, the failure conditions and the possible degraded/failure states of the resources (C11 -DT.FailB). This mechanism can be used by the analyst to specify components' state-based conditional failures (C11 -DT.FMDep). The negative aspect of the approach is the poor separation of concerns; in fact, new classes need to be defined and introduced in the system model, besides the classes representing the actual system components, for dependability analysis purposes (C17). Bernardi et al. [2004a Bernardi et al. [ , 2004b propose a set of UML class diagrams (C2), structured in packages (i.e., a CD framework) as a reusable pattern to collect dependability and realtime requirements of distributed control automation systems and to support the design of an appropriate fault tolerance strategy. They also propose a systematic method for the derivation of dependability analysis models, such as TRIO [Ghezzi et al. 1990 ] temporal logic models (C10). The class attributes define dependability or fault tolerance (R.T) characteristics; they can represent either input or output parameters (C11,C12 -DM.R, DM.A, DM.M) or upper/lower bound requirements (C13 -DR.BOUND), depending on the type of stereotype associated to the attribute (C6). The fault-error-failure (FEF) chain [Avizienis et al. 2004] as well as the fault tolerance mechanisms are represented as class diagrams. In particular, fault classes include attributes that characterize the fault timing persistency and occurrence rates (C11 -DT.FP, DT.FOQ) in system components. Error classes allow one to quantify error latencies, error probability, and bit error rates (C11 -DT.EQ) in automation functions. Finally, failures are classified according to their impact on the automation system in halting, degrading, and repairing failures (C11 -DT.FMD). From the analysis of TRIO temporal logic models, it is possible to visualize traces of the system execution that concentrate on the predicates of interest (C16). The requirement specification and analysis approach is compliant with the standard dependability management process [IEC-60300-3-1] (C15), and it has been applied on a primary substation of a power distribution network (C14). Unfortunately, the customization of the CD framework for a given application is a time-consuming activity; moreover, it requires modelers with expertise in the TRIO language to express predicates/axioms as well as to conduct the analysis of the TRIO models (C17).
4.5.3. Reliability and Safety. Reliability and safety (C8) topics are jointly treated by Mustafiz et al. [2008] , Mustafiz and Kienzle [2009] , Zarras et al. [2004] , Jürjens [2003] , and Jürjens and Wagner [2005] . The three approaches provide support in different phases of the software life cycle: requirement, software architecture, and design respectively (C1). Addouche et al. 2006] C1, C4, C5, C6, C8, C10, C11, C12, C17 [Bernardi et al. 2004a; 2004b] C1, C2, C4, C5, C8, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, C15, C16, C17 [Mustafiz et al. 2008; Mustafiz and Kienzle 2009] C1, C2, C3, C6, C8, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14 [Zarras et al. 2004] C1, C4, C6, C8, C10, C11, C12 [Jürjens 2003; Jürjens and Wagner 2005] C1, C6, C8, C10, C11, C12, C13 Mustafiz et al. [2008] and Mustafiz and Kienzle [2009] devise a requirement engineering process (DREP) for the elicitation, specification, and analysis of reliability and safety requirements. They extend use cases (C2,C3) to discover exceptional situations that can interrupt the system's normal behavior and to define derived requirements that handle such situations. Use cases are mapped to DA-Charts (C6), a type of statecharts where probabilities are associated to success/failure transitions (C11 -DT.FailB, DM.R). A Markov chain is then constructed from a DA-Chart (C10) to compute the reliability on demand and the probability of reaching safe states from the initial system state (C12 -DM.R, DM.S). The dependability analysis produces information for the designer on maximal achievable reliability and safety (C13 -DR.BOUND), considering only the failures of the system environment (e.g., hardware sensor failures) and assuming the system under development is reliable. The applicability and effectiveness of the DREP approach has been evaluated empirically, in an academic environment, using an electronic toll collection system as a case study (C14). Zarras et al. [2004] mainly address the reliability and safety analysis of composite Web services (C4); availability is also dealt with but as a secondary dependability property. They consider BPEL [BPEL 2007 ] as a software architecture specification language and propose a UML representation of BPEL constructs through stereotypes. UML extensions are also defined to express the parameters necessary for dependability analysis (C6). In particular, they include: reliability, safety, and availability measures (C12 -DM.R, DM.S, DM.A) to be computed, the fault characterization of objects (C11 -DT.FP, DT.FO, DT.FOQ) -such as fault rate, fault persistency, phase of occurrence, boundary, and nature -the failure domain and consistency (C11 -DT.FMD, DT.FMC), and redundancy schema within the devised FT techniques (C11 -R.L, R.F, R.R) -such as the type of adjudicators in error-detection mechanisms, the redundancy level, and the FT level of a redundant schema. The UML annotated models, are then transformed into Block diagrams and Markov models, which enable the dependability evaluation of the composite Web services (C10).
Jürjens [2003] and Jürjens and Wagner [2005] define safety and reliability checklists, using UML stereotypes and tags (C6) to support the analyst in the identification of failure-prone components (C12 -DM.S, DM.C) in the software design. The UML extensions are used to specify communication requirements -such as maximum probability of message loss and safety/reliability level (C13 -DR.BOUND, DR.S) -and the failure assumptions (C11 -DM.R) of communication links/nodes as a function of the failure domain (C11 -DT.FMD) and the type of voters within redundancy structures (C11 -R.R). A precise semantics is provided to check the design, via temporal logic formulas (C10), against the requirements and constraints specified in the proposed UML extensions. 4.5.4. Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety. Bernardi et al. [2011] propose a UML profile (namely DAM-C6), as a specialization of the OMG standard [UML-MARTE 2009] , to support the dependability analysis of UML-based software systems, in the early phases of the software life cycle (i.e., requirement, software architecture, and design-C1). In particular, the DAM profile focuses on the RAMS properties (C8) and its definition was based on a thorough analysis of different approaches, including those in the present survey, for dependability specification and analysis within UML. The main objective of the work has been to unify the terminology and concepts for different dependability aspects (C11-13 -DR.BOUND, DM, DT, FT.R, M.R, R.L, R.L, R.R) under a common, consistent dependability domain model, reusing the best practices and choices reported in literature on model transformation to generate formal dependability analysis models.
DISCUSSION
In this section we analyze, from a critical perspective, the set of contributions presented in Section 4. We use the criteria presented in Section 3 as guidelines for our discussion. Some considerations about the fulfillment of the dependability concepts from the checklist (Table I ) by the surveyed works will be also provided. In Table XVII , we have summarized the approaches and labeled them with an identifier that will be used throughout this section. The table is arranged according to the order of presentation of the approaches in Section 4, and the last column indicates the concrete subsection where the approach is discussed.
Software Engineering and UML Criteria
5.1.1. Life-Cycle Phase. The support provided by the approaches within the software life cycle spans from the requirement to the deployment phases (Figure 2 , Table XVIII), but most contributions are given in the early phases, particularly during requirement, software architecture, and design specification. This is an expected result, as occurred for performance model-based approaches [Balsamo et al. 2004] , since the major modeling effort is placed early in the life cycle, where the detection of both functional and nonfunctional (e.g., dependability, performance) problems is more effective from the software costs point of view.
We observed that a significant number of works aim at providing approaches to the dependability analysis of software systems, while few contributions address requirement elicitation or just dependability specification (i.e., how to express dependability characteristics in the software specification). Among the surveyed works, only Goseva et al. [2003] provide methods for the risk assessment of safety-critical systems.
The implementation and deployment stages are addressed by only one contribution each (Lu and Leangsuksun, respectively) , while none of the considered works focus on the testing phase. We think that research efforts should be devoted to combine modelbased approaches with experimental ones in the testing phase, such as by exploiting use-case methods to drive the testing activities through test cases and trace back the latter to dependability requirements.
Diagrams.
Concerning the UML specifications assumed as input to the method, class and deployment are the most-used structural diagrams (Table XIX) . Unlike in performance analysis of UML-based systems, where UML behavioral specifications are necessary to get a performance model, dependability models can be derived from structural specifications alone. At first sight, it seems unusual that deployment diagrams are used in works that address the early phases of the software life cycle. This can be justified, considering that dependability issues can arise not only from software faults but also from hardware ones (e.g., node crashes, broken communication physical links). Therefore, dependability requirements for a software system need to address not only the software but also the platform dependent architectures of the entire system (usually modeled by deployment diagrams).
Use cases, sequence, and state machines are the typically assumed behavioral diagrams. In particular, use-case diagrams are used not only in requirement elicitation approaches, but also in works addressing dependability analysis, mainly, to specify the operational profile (e.g., Singh and Cortellessa et al. [2001] ).
Observe that, apart from Bernardi-c, which provides support-through a profile-to dependability specification (only) for all UML diagrams, all the other surveyed works consider only a subset of UML diagrams. Note that Bondavalli is the contribution that enables dependability analysis based on the largest subset of UML diagrams. The surveyed works rely upon different UML versions (i.e., 1.4, 1.5, and 2.0), mainly according to the year of publication (Figure 3) . In general, the most important changes between UML 1.x and 2.x concern behavioral diagrams, specifically activity and sequence diagrams. However, none of the surveyed approaches that rely upon UML 1.x use activity diagrams. The ones that use sequence diagrams (D'Ambrogio, Yacoub, Singh, Hansen, Goseva, Bondavalli, and De Miguel) can, in principle, be applied to UML 2.x, since they consider independent execution scenarios -modeling each one with a simple sequential SD (i.e., without alternative, parallel, or optional sub-scenarios). Obviously, the software tools that support such approaches and rely on the UML metamodel (e.g., to produce automatically a formal dependability model) would need to be upgraded to the new UML version. UML2.0 supports more types of diagrams than UML1.x in particular the interaction overview diagrams (IODs), which are a combination of activity and sequence diagrams. IODs allow one to model system scenarios using a hierarchical approach. Nevertheless, even though the majority of the surveyed works support UML2.0, only Rodrigues and Bernardi-c use IODs.
5.1.3. Software Development Process. Most of the approaches follow the traditional software life cycle (Table XX) . The use-case approach is applied in some works to capture dependability requirements, besides the functional ones.
We can observe that there are several contributions using the component-based software development process. However, only one work, Liu, addresses the software product-line development process. Note also that a few surveyed works apply modeldriven development techniques, where software models are the main focus of the development. The use of model transformations to generate not only code but also analysis models is an intrinsic part of model-driven development.
5.1.4. Software and Application Domains. As shown in Figure 4 , most of the works either do not focus on a specific software domain or provide specific support to real-time (embedded) systems. Only Zarras addresses the SOA domain. The majority of the surveyed works support reliability analysis of general software systems, possibly fault-tolerant and distributed. We observe that the kind of dependability property to be evaluated is influenced by the software and the application domains considered by a given work. For instance, contributions focusing on real-time (embedded) systems are mainly concerned with safety issues. In particular, considering in detail the application domain (Table XXI) , we notice that most of the works that address aereospace, automotive, railway, automated, software, and healthcare systems are interested in providing support for safety analysis. On the other hand, in the case of transaction applications, it is often desirable to guarantee the continuity and the promptness of service delivery, when requested by the end-user. Therefore, reliability and availability are the main issues addressed by the works dealing with this type of application (Singh, Zarras) .
5.1.5. Dependability Specification. The specification of dependability requirements and properties can be done by (a) providing a specific UML profile; (b) using a set of UML standard extensions (that is, stereotypes and tagged values), not structured in a profile 4 ; (c) using regular nonextended UML models and (d) using OCL ( Figure 5 ). In Total  17  5  2  2  2  3  2 particular, when regular models are used, they are the same UML diagrams-like use cases applied in the requirement elicitation approaches-or ad hoc ones, like statemachine variants (Mustafiz, Iwu) . Other approaches use UML models to extrapolate dependability information (Genero, Hansen, Goseva) . Finally, only Hawkins and Lu use the Object Constraint Language (OCL) to specify safety-related requirements and constraints. Table XXII details the type of specification used by each considered approach. The definition of a UML profile requires more effort with respect to proposing a set of extensions but has the advantage of defining consistent extensions, in a structured framework. The majority of the approaches that resort to profiling techniques define the profile in the context of existing standard OMG UML profiles, such as Schedulability, Performance, and Time [UML-SPT 2005] (Rodrigues, Grassi, Cortellessa, Bondavalli, Addouche) and the Modeling and Analysis of Real-Time Embedded System [UML-MARTE 2009] (Cancila, Bernardi-c) , which has the advantage of exploiting the specification capabilities of the standard profile. Although a lot of effort has been devoted to proposing UML extensions to support dependability specification in UML-based systems, less attention has been paid to providing a solution for the unification of the different proposals. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, only Bernardi-c tackled this issue. Currently, a standard OMG proposal for a dependability profile does not exist yet. We think that more research should be invested in providing a common UML framework for the modeling and analysis of different NFPs in order to support the consistent specification of different NFPs and their relationships, as well as the trade-off analysis between different NFPs (such as performability, performance and security, security and dependability).
5.1.6. Tool Support. As shown in Figure 6 , the majority of works provides tool support for the approaches they propose. Although most of the tools are research prototypes that do not cover all aspects, the potential for building more powerful tool support exists. Many approaches could be automated since they propose either rigorous transformation techniques of UML-annotated models into formal dependability models or dependability annotations through the UML profiling mechanism. Only a few proposals are difficult to implement or do not provide any indication of an existing implementation. Those are mainly approaches that address dependability requirements elicitation via use cases (Allenby and Johannessen) or class diagrams (Bernardi-b) or focus on severity analysis (Hassan).
Dependability Characteristics Criteria
5.2.1. Attribute. Concerning dependability attributes, most of the surveyed approaches address either reliability or safety issues, while few efforts have been devoted to maintainability and availability (Figure 7) . Indeed, the latter are often considered as secondary dependability issues. In particular, the stochastic approaches proposed for reliability analysis can also be used, as claimed by the authors, to compute availability and maintainability measures (e.g., steady state availability, MTTR) given that the additional quantitative characterization of the repair or recovery activities is provided (e.g., repair rate) as an input parameter. A unique exception is Genero, where a set of size and complexity metrics for UML class diagrams are proposed as indicators of the software specification maintainability. 
Analysis Type.
One of the considered criteria is the type of dependability analysis proposed: qualitative or quantitative (Figure 8 ). Qualitative analysis aims to identify, classify, and rank the hazards or failure modes in the software systems, while quantitative analysis mainly aims to compute dependability measures. We notice that safety-related contributions fall basically in the first category (i.e., qualitative) while the works that focus on reliability, maintainability, and availability belong to the second one (i.e., quantitative). There are some exceptions that support both types of analysis, such as the works on safety by Ober, Goseva, Hassan, and Cancila and the works of Bernardi-b, Dal Cin, Jürjens, and Bernardi-c, providing support for dependability specification.
Considering the approaches aimed at quantitative dependability analysis, the majority of them rely on stochastic (or probabilistic) assumptions. Nevertheless, there are also nonstochastic approaches to dependability analysis, such as Ober and Bernardi-b, that support the verification of time-dependent dependability requirements of real-time systems.
5.2.3. Analysis Model. Table XXIII summarizes the techniques adopted by the surveyed works to support dependability analysis of UML-based specifications. This criterion does not apply to the approaches that provide support only for dependability specification (shown in gray in Table XXIII) .
Some of the techniques used are those suggested by dependability standards, such as FMEA, HAZOP, Petri net, Fault Tree, the Markov model, the Bayesian model, and the Block diagram [IEC-60300-3-1 2003] . In particular, Fault Tree and its variants (e.g., dynamic fault tree) is the mostly-used dependability technique, followed by Markov models. Fault trees have been applied in both reliability (D'Ambrogio, Pai, Leangsuksun) and safety works (Iwu, Liu, Hawkins, Hassan) , and for both qualitative (Iwu, Liu, Hawkins, Hassan) and quantitative (D'Ambrogio, Pai, Leangsuksun) analysis.
Some contributions propose instead techniques that are not traditionally aimed at dependability analysis, such as component dependency graphs (Yacoub) . Finally, there are a few approaches, like Hassan and Iwu, that suggest the combined use of several complementary techniques. Figure 9 shows three histograms that represent the number of surveyed approaches addressing the items of the checklist in Table I , namely We observe that the specification of dependability requirements is supported by few approaches. In particular, most of the works that aim at evaluating system reliability do not provide support for the validation of the estimated reliability measures with regard to the requirements. Dependability measures are often considered as both input parameters and output results in a given approach (D'Ambrogio, Yacoub, Rodrigues, Singh, Pai, Grassi, Cortellessa, DeMiguel, Leangsuksun, Addouche, Bernardi-b, Mustafiz, Bernardi-c) . For example, the failure occurrence rate is associated to software component/connectors (i.e., input parameters for the method) and to the system level as well (i.e., output result provided by the method).
Parameters and Requirements.
None of the surveyed approaches provide any indication of how to assign values to the input parameters. Input parameters are simply assumed values. The value assignment can be trivial for some input parameters, such as the MTTF of hardware components, is usually provided by the manufacturer; however this is not the case for most of the parameters (e.g., the MTTF value of a software component).
The most frequent items are reliability measures (DM.R) and safety properties (DM.S). This is not surprising since most of the surveyed works address reliability and safety issues.
Regarding the other dependability parameters, although each item is addressed by at least a work, several of them are only marginally dealt with. For example, while special attention has been devoted to the specification of failure modes with respect to the domain (DT.FMD) and to the use of hazard guide-words (DT.HGW), few works consider other classifications of failure modes, such as failure detectability (DT.FMDet) and consistency (DT.FMC). On the other hand, few efforts have been devoted to maintenance issues-such as modifications (M.M -Genero) and repair (M.R -Bernardi-c)-and to supporting a comprehensive specification of redundancy in fault-tolerant systems. For instance, only Zarras provides UML extensions to specify the maximum number of replica failures that can be tolerated (R.F).
Dependability Modeling and Analysis of Software Systems Specified with UML 2:37 Figure 10 shows the number of checklist items addressed by each surveyed approach. Such a number is a raw quality metric for the evaluation of the approach itself, giving some insight as to its comprehensiveness in providing support for dependability modeling and/or analysis. Obviously, such a metric should not be considered in isolation since other aspects are important as well, as discussed in the next subsection. Note that Bernardi-c is the approach that considers the most items, since it actually builds on several approaches considered in the survey. Nevertheless, it does not provide a specific method to analyze the system dependability but, rather, supports the dependability specification through a UML profile. On the other hand, Bondavalli is the second approach in the checklist coverage; unlike Bernardi-c, it also proposes a method to derive formal models amenable for dependability analysis.
Quality Criteria
5.3.1. Validation and Compliance with Standards. Method validation is not a primary issue among the surveyed works, as shown in Figure 11 (a). Indeed, 12 out of 33 of the surveyed approaches do not consider it at all. On the other hand, when validation is a concern, it is carried out mainly to show the applicability and/or the scalability of the method to realistic examples, such as through case studies. The 19 approaches that address a case study are: Singh, Pai, David, Bernardi-a, Allenby, Johannessen, Hansen, Iwu, Liu, Patarizca, Ober, Goseva, Hassan, Zoughbi, Bondavalli, Bernardi-b, Zarras, Jürjens, and Bernardi-c . Only few works (Genero and Mustafiz) conduct empirical analysis in an academic environment, to assess the effectiveness of the proposed approaches beside their applicability.
We observed that all approaches providing support for quantitative dependability analysis are in fact missing the validation of the correctness of the proposed methods. This could be achieved, for example, by comparing the analysis results with the ones obtained in testing activities, such as injecting faults during the system execution.
Concerning the compliance of the method with respect to dependability engineering standards, only 12 out of 33 approaches adhere to some standard, as shown in Figure 11 (b). Most of the compliant approaches focus on safety issues in the development of real-time and embedded systems (Allenby, Johannessen, Iwu, Goseva, Hassan, Cancila, Zoughbi, Lu) , for which a certification from third parties is required. 
Presentation of Results.
The majority of the approaches addressing dependability analysis provide a basic support to present the results of the analysis (Figure 12 ). The most common way is textual presentation, followed by graphics and tables. We observed that sensitivity analysis is supported by several works that address reliability and availability analysis. The most promising approaches are those that feedback the results to the original UML specification (Rodriguez, Liu, Pataricza, Hassan, and Jürjens) ; this makes the analysis process transparent to the software analyst.
However, further research is needed to address this issue. In particular, one open issue concerns how to identify the critical elements of the UML specification that cause unresolved dependability properties. Good solutions are those that provide useful information to the software engineers for changing the design accordingly. Finally, in Figure 12 , there are seven approaches classified as not available (i.e., NA): They are either aimed at dependability specification, rather than analysis, or provide transformation techniques without focusing on the analysis of the derived formal models.
5.3.3. Limitations. Almost all the surveyed approaches present limitations, as summarized in detail in Table XXIV . In particular, several proposals aimed at reliability analysis assume failure independence of system components (Yacoub, Rodrigues, Singh, Grassi, Zarras, Leangsuksun) . However, this assumption, which facilitates the analysis of the derived reliability model, may not hold for systems characterized by tightly coupled components. An example of such systems are the ever-demanding, complex, large-scale ICT infrastructures that control distributed embedded systems (e.g., distributed SCADA systems controlling power production and distribution plants located in a given geographical area). Another limitation that is common to some approaches is low scalability (Bernardi-a, Hansen, Hawkins) that can make the validation and verification activities time-consuming and risky from the point of view of software development process management or, even worse, unfeasible. have been devoted to availability and maintainability modeling and analysis. Moreover, we have not found any work addressing specifically how to extend UML with integrity NFP, which is also a dependability concern.
Second, the surveyed works provide support mainly in the early phases of the software life cycle (i.e., from requirement to design), while there is a lack of support for later phases, as for example for testing dependability NFPs guided by the use-cases.
Third, those contributions that support model transformation mainly focus on obtaining formal models that are amenable for dependability analysis. However, only a few go one step further to provide feedback from the analysis results to the original UML model specification, in order to pinpoint requirement inconsistencies or design flaws. It is also worth noticing that tool support and method validation are crucial factors for making an approach effectively applicable. Although the majority of the surveyed approaches are characterized by a high degree of automation, most of them are not fully supported by a software tool. Moreover, in many cases, method validation consists only in applying the proposed method to a case study. Considering the approaches that provide support for quantitative dependability analysis, the validation of the correctness of the proposed methods is in fact missing. More efforts should be devoted to the validation of the methods themselves.
Last but not least, more research work should be invested in providing a standard common UML framework for the modeling and analysis of several NFPs, in order to support the consistent specification of different NFPs and their relationships, as well as the trade-off analysis between different NFPs (such as performability, performance and security, security and dependability).
Finally, an important issue to consider for future work is to investigate the current request for proposals (RFPs) for UML that are now being considered and their potential impact on the area of dependability modeling with UML.
APPENDIX

A. APPENDIX
The Unified Modeling Language [UML 2005 ] is a general purpose standardized modeling language used for software development. It proposes a set of diagrams that allow description of the structural and behavioral views of a system as well as the hardware platform where the same is deployed. UML has extensive tool support.
The system structure may be described in UML by a component diagram and/or a class diagram. The first contains components and connectors that can be packaged or grouped to form subsystems, which in turn are grouped to form higher-level subsystems and eventually a system. Components can be logical or physical. A component provides services offered through its interfaces and may require services from other components. A class diagram allows for representing in detail the internal structure of the system components. The behavioral view of the system is specified using use-cases, activity diagrams, sequence diagrams, and state machines, or a combination of them. Section A.1 offers some examples of UML diagrams and a brief explanation of their basic features.
UML 2 introduced the profile mechanism as a meta-modeling technique to extend and adapt the language for different purposes. Reasons to extend UML are diverse; for example, to introduce terminology adapted to a given platform or domain (e.g., the EJB profile [UML-EDOC 2001]) or to add semantics not already present in UML that can be used for model transformation purposes (e.g., the profile [UML-MARTE 2009] extends UML with concepts from the real-time and embedded systems domain, facilitating the derivation of performance or schedulability analysis models from UML+MARTE models). Since profiles are standard extension mechanisms, they are recognized by standard UML tools and can be exchanged among them.
Stereotypes and tagged-values are extension mechanisms used to define a profile. A stereotype extends one or more UML meta-classes and can be applied to UML model elements (components, states, transitions, etc.) . For example, MARTE introduces a stereotype for a well-known concept from the the real-time domain, that of "type of clock," which extends the UML meta-class "Class." Figure 13 (a) depicts the definition of the stereotype "clockType." The stereotype can be applied to any Class instance in a UML+MARTE model by labeling it with clockType, as shown in Figure 13(b) . Last, tagged-values represent the attributes of the stereotypes; for instance, Figure 13 (a) shows the attributes of the "clockType" stereotype (nature, unitType, and so on).
A.1. Examples of UML-Annotated Models
The purpose of this subsection is twofold: on one hand, a reader unfamiliar with UML can learn a few essential aspects of some of the most important UML diagrams; on the other hand, we show excerpts of some of the works surveyed in this paper. This way, the reader can see how stereotypes and tagged-values are used to model dependability concepts within UML models (it is informally known as "UML-annotated models for dependability").
A use-case diagram (UCD) identifies the functionalities of a system at a high abstraction level. Each functionality is depicted as an ellipse (called use-case) that interacts with actors (humans or other systems) to carry out system responsibilities. Figure 14 depicts the UCD of a system meant to provide reliable communication; it has only one use-case and two actors, the client sending the messages and the receiver. The use-case is stereotyped as a reliability handler following Mustafiz et al. [2008] , which means that the use-case addresses exceptional situations that threaten system reliability. The diagram also depicts an annotation from Bernardi et al. [2011] , which defines the use-case as a service. This annotation indicates that service steady state availability should be predicted (by analysis) as a rate of the successful messages ($Xack) out of all delivered messages ($Xrequest).
The deployment diagram (DD) identifies the system software components as well as the hardware nodes in which the former are deployed. In this case, we have used the proposal of Bondavalli et al. [2001] and Majzik et al. [2003] ; see Figure 14 . It identifies which software and hardware are stateful or stateless and which components are working as redundancy managers, variants, or adjudicators in a fault tolerance architecture. The sequence diagram shows the messages exchanged between the system components. It provides useful constructors such as loops, alternatives, or parallel execution. The example illustrated in Figure 15 corresponds to Cortellessa and Pompei [2004] . It offers roles for the components, connectors, and actors, as well as probabilities of execution or failure for all these elements. This sequence diagram partially describes the system scenario represented by the previous use case, the message replication service.
The activity diagram, as shown in Figure 16 , specifies the control flow of a component, subsystem, or system. It is widely used for modeling business processes, workflows, or system low-level processes. It features most of the common control flow structures such as decision, fork, join, loop, or merge. Figure 16 models a partial behavior of a reliable communication system and illustrates the failure specification using the proposal of Bernardi et al. [2011] .
